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CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY JURISDICTION.
Ir I need any apology for calling attention to this subject, perhaps I may find it in the fact that it suggests questions upon which
some of our most eminent jurists have differed, and some of our
ablest courts have been in conflict with each other. It may prove
interesting to study the relation of general jurisdiction to special;
to inquire whether the latter may ever be presumed by reason of
the existence of the former; to find what the record of a superior
court should show in order to render its judgment impervious to
collateral attack, when it has been exercising jurisdiction conferred
by statute upon conditions.
There is a variety of judicial proceedings, not warranted by the
common law, which look to legislative authorization for their right
to be. Authorization is usually given when ordinary means are
deemed inadequate to subserve the ends of justice, and when there
has been compliance on the part of the petitioner or the court with
certain requisites. It is quite common that affidavits to prescribed
facts, publication notices to absentees, and bonds to indemnify those
who may be injured by the application of extraordinary remedies,
are required. It is quite well settled that the requisites must be
observed, but some- have thought that there is an exception when
attachment proceedings are not in _personam. In order to present
this first part of my paper, I will put the question :
I. In a proceeding in rem under statutory authorization, is it
essential to complete jurisdiction that all the conditions be observed,
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if there has been seizure under a writ, fair on its face, issued by a
superior court ?
If not, the judgment could not be absolutely void, though it
might be voidable by reason of non-compliance with conditions; it
could not be collaterally assailed, though it might be reasonable on
appeal, as every one knows.
It is well settled that superior courts stand on the same footing
as inferior courts with respect to the acquisition of special jurisdiction. The general rule is applicable to both, that nothing shall
be intended as within authority beyond what appears of record, so
far as concerns statutory authorization. While it is freely conceded, on all sides, that courts of superior or general jurisdiction
are always presumed to act within it when exercising common-law
authority, and that their errors in its exercise are therefore merely
voidable; and while it may be granted, just as plausibly, that such
courts, once fully vested with special jurisdiction: have the presumption in favor of its lawful exercise, yet they, no more than
inferior courts, are presumed to possess special, statutory authorization by reason of their general, common-law jurisdiction.
It is also well settled that proceedings by attachment are in rem
-against property only-when the debtor has not appeared nor
been summoned. - It is a limited proceeding of the sort, intended
not to conclude the world, as a general one does, but to conclude
only.the owner, alleged to be indebted, and his privies. It is prosecuted, not by virtue of any common-law right, but strictly by
virtue of a conditional authorization by the legislature in derogation
of the common law.
Those who hold the affirmative of my question infer, from the
repugnancy of the attachment remedy to the common law, and
from the limitation of extraordinary remedies to circuimstances
under which the ordinary would be unavailing, that seizure must
be in obedience to statute in order to confer complete special jurisdiction in a case in rem, in a superior court as in any other. They
hold that to resort to such remedies, without compliance with the
conditions imposed by legislative power when granting these means,
would be assuming jurisdiction unlawfully; that judges, under
such circumstances, have no more right than any private person to
command the seizure of property to secure merely ordinary debts
befbre the indebtedness has been proved and judicially ascertained.
They hold that, since the office of attachment is to create a lien as
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well as to enforce it, and since the lien is not conventional but
purely a creature of the law operating under prescribed circumstances and applied under stated conditions, there can be no right
or power in any court to issue a writ of attachment prior to
judgment by virtue of anything inherent in its general jurisdiction ;
and that, whether the alleged debtor be in court or not, the rule is
the same.
Attachment proceedings in rem, according to those holding the
affirmative of the question propounded, must follow the statute with
respect to the publication notice as well as with regard to the initiatory act of seizure; for, they say, though the appearance of the
defendant, in a personal action, would cure the defects of previous
notice, no such result can take place in a proceeding prosecuted to
the end against attached property only.
The jurisdiction acquired by. lawful seizure does not render
publication an act in the mere exercise of this jurisdiction, say
they; for, whatever may be the rule in proceedings in rem not
st1ftutory, the court can have no authority to proceed to judgment
without publication when the statute renders such notice indispensable to complete jurisdiction. As a court, by reason of its general
powers, may entertain an ordinary case in personam so far as to
order citation, and yet not have full authority to determine it before
citation shall have been made, so it may order property attached
upon a proper showing, yet be judicially incompetent to condemn
it to pay the alleged debt sued upon, until the publication shall have
tendered, to the absent owner of the property, his day in court.
When the statute does not expressly say that publication is indispensable to complete jurisdiction, yet if it requires this form of
notice in all cases when personal citation cannot be had (as all the
attachment laws do, as a general rule), it is still true (the advocates
of the affirmative contend), that publication is jurisdictional in the
statutory proceeding in rem, like citation in any suit in personam.
No one seems to doubt that lawful seizure, based upon an
affidavit made in substantial accordance with the statute authorizing
attachment, gives jurisdiction to order the sale of perishable goods
when they have been the subject of the seizure, and to do whatever
may be essential to conserve the property thus rightfully in the
court's hands by its executive officer. But this is only one degree
of that jurisdictioii which needs publication to round it to perfection; for the legislator, in granting special authority to the courts
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upon conditions, may and does provide that it shall reach completeness by successive steps; and whatever may be true respecting
common-law jurisdiction, this is a gradually developed power by
the terms of the statutes. Thus argue those who occupy the affirmative side of my question.
I think the majority of the profession are on that side ; indeed
that nearly all of the bench and bar of the country hold the views
above set forth with regard to the jurisdictional character of both
the affidavit and the publication in attachment suits in rem. The
decisions of the Supreme Courts of the states to this effect are far
too numerous to be cited here; they may be found by scores in any
treatise upon attachment. And I think their position, as well as
that which has been held by the federal Supreme Court, is well
expressed by Chief Justice MARSHALL in an ejectment suit assailing
a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction in a cause under
statutory authorization, as jurisdictionless for lack of required publications: " These publications are indispensable preliminaries.
They do not appear to have been made. The judgment was given
without it appearing, by recital or otherwise, that the requisitions
of the law had been complied with. We think this ought to have
appeared in the record.
"In summary proceedings, where a court exercises an extraordinary power under a special statute prescribing its course, we think
that course ought to be exactly observed ; and those facts, especially, which give jurisdiction, ought to appear in order to show
that its proceedings are coram judice." Thatcher v. Powell, 6
Wheat. 119.
The negative is presented in Cooper v. Beynolds, 10 Wall. 308.
The court held that though the affidavit be not such as the statute
requires, it has performed its function when the writ is issued and
the attachment made; that the levy, even though made on such
affidavit, "is the one essential requisite to jurisdiction ;" that all
the proceedings that follow, including notice, are merely the exercise of jurisdiction ; that it could not be held that the court (whose
judgment they were considering), "1had no jurisdiction for want
of a'sufficient publication notice."
The facts of this case may be bniefly stated. Brownlow sued
Reynolds, in Tennessee, for damages, but failed to effect service.
He attached land, and publication was ordered, but the record did
not disclose that the order was obeyed. No importance was given
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to the recital in the judgment of the court of Tennessee that publication had been made, but the case before the United States
Supreme Court, above entitled, was decided on the assumption that
there had been no legal notice, since the record disclosed none.
The land was condemned, and sold to Cooper. Reynolds brought
suit of ejectment against Cooper, won it in the lower court, and
Cooper took it to the United States Supreme Court. It was in this
cbllateral suit that the above stated principles were enounced.
The syllabus of the reported case is misleading. The first four
divisions of it are unobjectionable. The fifth correctly states the
deliverance, that seizure alone gives jurisdiction. But the substitution of" defective or irregular affidavits and publications of notice,"
for invalid ones, such as the court assumed in their reasoning, is
misleading. The sixth states that where there is a "valid writ
and levy.," the proceeding cannot be held void when collaterally
assailed; but the very question before the court was whether they
could be "valid" without compliance with statutory requisites, and
it was held that they could so far as to be invulnerable to collateral
attack.
The court said that the affidavit is "the preliminary to issuing
the writ," and "has served its purpose" when the writ is issued
and levied, though "requisite formalities" have not been observed;
and, "though a revisory court might see in some such departure
from the strict direction of the statute sufficient error to reverse
the judgment, we are unable to see how that can deprive the court
of jurisdiction acquired by the writ levied upon the defendant's
property.
"So also of the publication notice. It is the duty of the court
to order such publication, and to see that it has been properly
made; and, undoubtedly, if there had been no such publication, a
court of error might reverse the judgment. But when the writ
has been issued, the property seized, and that property has been
condemned and sold, we cannot hold that there has been no jurisdiction for want of -a sufficient publication notice."
The argument is as follows: In proceedings in rem, seizure gives
jurisdiction-attachment proceedings, without a personal defendant,
are in rem-therefore, seizure gives jurisdiction in such attachment
proceedings. Is the premiss admissible ? It is true that jurisdiction
is acquired by seizure in all proceedings against property? There
are several classes of such actions, not all governed by the same
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rule. The difference between the actio in rem under the law of
nations to declare the status of hostile property, and that under
municipal law to vindicate a lien are quite marked. In the former
the thing proceeded against has the status of its owner, and there
is no need to invite an enemy to the trial when he, by public law,
has no standing in the court which he is fighting to destroy. The
notice is therefore to all, having an interest in the res, other than
the enemy. In case of a prize ship, taken in battle, notice or
monition is sometimes deemed unnecessary. The property of an
enemy is already forfeited, under the laws of war: the.judicial
procedure is merely to ascertain whether the thing seized is the
property of an enemy; and, if so, to declare its status.
But a proceeding against property to enforce a lien requires
notification to all interested. The thing is not to be declared forfeit, but merely condemned to satisfy debt; its surplus value belongs
to its owner. Offending things are prosecuted as forfeited, but
there must be general notice as well as seizure. When taken upon
water, pursuant to the revenue, navigation and other laws of the
country, the proceeding against them is in admiralty, after
monition.
Cooley says, speaking generally of proceedings in rem, and of
admiralty by way of illustration: "In cases within this class,
notice to all concerned is required to be given, either personally or
by some species of publication or proclamation; and, if not given,
the court which has jurisdiction of the property will have none to
enter judgment;" that is, not complete jurisdiction to hear and
determine: Cooley's Const. Lim., 5th ed., 498.
The recognition of the difference between "jurisdiction of the
property," and "jurisdiction to enter judgment," suggests at once
the fallacy of the syllogism detected in the premises we'are considering, in which one word is made to stand for both ideas. If it
is not true that seizure gives jurisdiction to enter judgment unless
there is notification, the only judicial power it gives is that of holding the res for further proceedings, conserving it, converting it when
necessary from perishable goods to imperishable money, &c. And
this doctrine of degrees in the acquisition of special jurisdiction is
as well founded in reason as in practice. A court may have
authority at one stage of a cause to a limited extent; it may have
more, when some second jurisdictional requisite has been observed,
and it may be obliged to take several separate steps before becoming
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clothed with complete power to condemn and sell the subject of the
seizure. And these steps are not necessarily in the exercise of
jurisdiction acquired by the first step; they may be, and often they
are, several successive acquisitions of power, according to the terms
of the statute conferring them, or the rules of the practice governing them.
It is of great importance that the precise meaning of the term
should be understood when an argument turns upon the word.
"jurisdiction ;" for it has many significations. We qualify it so
as to show what we distinctly mean when we speak of equity,
admiralty, probate, criminal, original, appellate, limited, general,
territorial, state and federal jurisdictions. But when we use the
term unqualifiedly, and say that there is jurisdiction when the
defendant has been cited, it means merely that there is judicial
authority in a personal suit: no one would contend that special
authority over property could be meant in the absence of a levy.
So, when it is said that seizure gives jurisdiction, we have no
reference to power over the person of the defendant, but only to
that over the thing seized. And we would not know the extent or
degree of this power, from this general statement. In the extract
above from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, we should have
been uncertain of the significance of the term jurisdiction, or should
have been misled by it, had not the concluding words relieved it of
all ambiguity.
The premiss: " In a proceeding in rem, seizure gives jurisdiction," is true if "jurisdiction of the property" (to quote from
Cooley) is meant; but it is untrue, if jurisdiction "to enter judgment" is to be understood, since "some species of publication"
must be added to complete the judicial authority to condemn the
property as forfeited, or to enforce the lien, conventional or legal,
perfect or inchoate, which is the object of the proceeding.
The books are full of fallacies based upon the abuse of this term
"jurisdiction"-its use in different senses in the same argument
without differentiation. There are wrong judgments traceable to
this illogical application of the term. Many judges seem to think
that special jurisdiction is wholly conferred at once; so that, if
custodial authority over the res is in the court, all other essentials
to full jurisdiction are mere steps in the exercise of this special
power.
There is nothing in procedure against a thing, more than in that
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against a persofi, which can render nugatory what statutes require,
or what is nvcessary to complete jurisdiction for any other reason.
The former is not especially entitled to legal favor. There is no
constitutional provision which gives it the preference. "Dub
course.46f law as administered in courts of justice" when the con.
stitution was adopted, did not allow titles to be divested, and pro,
pefty shorn of conventional liens, without offering a day in court
to interested parties, after property had been seized for condemnation , nor did it give courts the right and power to condemn without invitation to those parties.
But if, in any class of suits against things, seizure alone gives
jurisdiction to enter judgment, it cannot be so in suits wholly
governed by statutes which require more than that to confer such
jurisdiction. I will enlarge upon this when discussing the middle
term of the syllogism, to which I now call attention. It is:
"Attachment proceedings are in rem when there is no personal
defendant."
It may be conceded-that they are such. They have
been held to be such by the Supreme Court of the United States and
by many of the state Supreme Courts, and the wonder is that any
tribunal ever should have doubted a fact so manifest. But they are
not analogous to general proceedings in which all persons must be
notified, since all.are to be concluded by the decree ; in that peculiarity, they are analogous to the extent of the interest of the owner
of the thing seized, and the conclusiveness of the decree upon him
and his privies, and therefore in the necessity for his being invited
to come voluntarily to court to defend his seized property. But,
were analogy wanting altogether, attachment of property must be
accompanied by invitation to the owner of it, if he is not within
the territorial jurisdiction so that he can be commanded to come, by
summons. Publication notice is not "substantial service,'" as it is
sometimes termed; it is merely an invitation. The states which
require the mailing of a summons to a debtor living beyond their
jurisdiction, do not thus change the invitation to a command, whatever they may mean to do. Doubtless such mailing may be good
as notice, but it cannot hold as citation-cannot make the recipient
of the summons officially mailed to him a party to the attachment
suit. If the notified absentee was thus made a party, the proceeding
in rem would become ancillary, and the principal suit would be a
personal one.
The statutory authorization of attachment usually provides that
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an affidavit shall be made; that it shall contain certain prescribed
particulars ; that a bond shall be given to secure the alleged debtor
from harm should the creditor abuse the extraordinary remedy
which he invokes ; that certain information respecting the creditor's
claim, the property seized to secure it, the court which is to pass
upon the case, time within which the debtor may offer, &c., shall
be published for a definite number of days, weeks or times. Who
shall say that a legislature may not require all this, and make
every requirement a condition to the special authorization to go out
and administer the extraordinary remedy of attachment?
The middle term of the syllogism should be written: "Attachment proceedings are wholly in rem when there is no personal
defendant, but they are subject to legislative provisions as to what
gives jurisdiction."
The conclusion, that seizure alone gives jurisdiction in attachment suits in rem, is seen to be falsely drawn, if "jurisdiction to
enter judgment" is meant.
If we discuss this matter of jurisdiction upon principle we shall
see that the legislature could not grant authority to the courts based
upon no other ground than the lev.y upon property in obedience to
their own process. Attachment suits are not for the enforcement
of a jus in re, like a proceeding to declare forfeiture; nor are they
for the vindication of a perfected jus ad rem, like a mortgage foreclosure, or a suit to enforce any conventional right in the property
seized. They are for the purpose of creating a lien by operation
of law under extraordinary circumstances, as well as to enforce it.
It is no more competent for the legislature to give the creditor a
lien absolutely, than it would be to transfer property from one
owner to another arbitrarily. It is only because property should
be held responsible for the debts of its owner, if the debt be established and right of execution should subsequently arise upon judgment, that the legislature may provide for the conservation of the
property, when the debtor by absconding, being absent, hiding his
goods or the like, renders the ordinary remedy inadequate. It is
therefore obligatory upon the legislative power that they should give
the debtor opportunity to defend his property before the court can
lawfully create a lien and order a sale to satisfy it. It is necessary.
to the constitutionality of the authorization that the safeguards
should be required; and there can be no jurisdiction to condemn
the seized property to pay the alleged debt, without them.
VOL. XXX.-62
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The court, in the Cooper case, appealed to principle as well as
to authority; and it is submitted that jurisdiction complete, upon
seizure pursuant to a writ valid on its face, without a sufficient underlying affidavit, without the required bond, and without notification, cannot be sustained upon principle.
The authorities cited in the case (p. 316 of 10 Wall.), were only
to the point that errors in the exercise of lawful jurisdiction cannot
be collaterally exposed. Nobody disputes the proposition. The
acquisition of lawful special jurisdiction was the bone of contention
in that case, not the exercise of it after it has once been legally
lodged.
If this case is to be confined to that principle, there will be no
overturning of attachment as a system, and of the received doctrine
that statutory conditions must all be observed in order to create the
special jurisdiction for the administration of the extraordinary
remedy. I think the authority of this decision should be confined
to that principle, so as to make it harmonize with prior and subsequent deliverances of the same tribunal. It is not impossible for
any court to mistake the facts of a case, or to misapprehend the
provisions of a statute under construction. It can hardly be conceived that any court would go so far as to hold that without any
compliance with any statutory condition, it could acquire special
jurisdiction by its own process, so as to preclude collateral attack.
The profession generally have not understood the Cooper case to
go so far, but ]iave considered it as merely one more authority on
the exercise of full jurisdiction by a superior court. That they
have not thought the prominence given to seizure important and
the only point of the case, but have taken the other part of the
opinion as the purport of the decision, appears from the fact that
the bench and the bar of the country have held generally to the
views herein set forth as their arguments in support of the affirmative of my question, notwithstanding Cooper v. Reynold& Courts
still hold statutory requisites sacramental in the creation of liens
to secure ordinary debt, just as they held before that decision was
rendered; and they make no exception in favor of attachment proceedings in rem.
But, the negative side asks: Is not the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States conclusive ? The other side answers
that the question before it was: What are the requisites to jurisdiction in an attachment case under the laws of Tennessee ? That

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY JURISDICTION.

was the one argued before the court. That was understood by it
to be the question, for the statutes of that state and the decisions
thereon came under review. That was the understanding of the
dissenting justice who placed his non-concurrence on the ground
that those statutes required more for the acquisition of jurisdiction
than the record disclosed.
Though the court has since sought to give the decision a wider
scope (as we shall soon see) yet the Supreme Courts of the states
have not generally understood it to be of universal application.
They have adhered to the doctrines set forth as those held by the
affirmative side of my question, since the rendition of the decision
as before. Time and space would fail me were I to attempt the
presentation of the many decisions, rendered since, to the effect that
conditional statutory jurisdiction cannot be lodged in any court
without compliance with the conditions.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee said since: "To dispense
with the prescribed publication and proceed to take jurisdiction upon
the levy of the attachment alone, would be to act in violation of
the statutes and not in conformity to them." "We may as well
dispense with the levy as with the publication." (Walker v. Gottrell, 6 Bax. 257.) The court was discussing the Cooper case and
evidently thought its bearing was upon the statutes of Tennessee.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a later decision,
has held the opposite doctrines to that of the Cooper case. In
Windsor v. Mc Veigh, 93 U. S. 274, 278, which was an ejectment suit, in which there was a collateral attack upon a judgment
rendered in a proceeding in rem "purely" so, as much as any to
be found anywhere in the books, that court said: "The position of
the defendant's counsel is, that, as the proceeding for the confiscation of the property was one in rem, the court, by seizure of the
property, acquired jurisdiction to determine its liability to forfeiture,
and consequently had a right to decide all questions subsequently
arising in the progress of the cause; and its decree, however erroneous, cannot, therefore, be collaterally assailed. In supposed support of this position, opinions of this court in several cases are
cited, where similar language is used respecting the power of a
court to pass upon questions arising after jurisdiction has been
attached. But the preliminary proposition of the counsel is not
correct. The jurisdiction acquired by the court by seizure of the
res was not to condemn the property without further proceedings.
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* * * The seizure in a suit in rem only brings the property seized
within the custody of the court and informs the owner of that fact.
* * * The jurisdiction acquired by the seizure is not to pass upon
the question of forfeiture absolutely, but to pass upon that question
after opportunity has been afforded to its owner and parties interested to appear and be heard upon the charges. To this end, some
notification of the proceedings, beyond that arising from the seizure,
presenting the time within which the appearance must be made, is
essential. Such notification is usually given by monition, public
proclamation or publication in some form. The manner of the
notification is immaterial, but the notification itself is essential."
How different is this from the assertion in Cooper v. Reynolds, that
seizure alone is "unquestionably" the one essential requisite to
jurisdiction in proceedings "purely" in rem.
This is followed by a decided approval of Judge STORY's decision in Bradstreetv. Neptune Ins. Co., 3 Sumner 601, and Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 Vt.65; copious quotations are made, and the
doctrine therein strongly asserted (that seizure alone does not give
complete jurisdiction in a proceeding in rem, but that notification
is jurisdictional), is stated most emphatically. Thus the argument
drawn from general proceedings in rem, in the Cooper case, is completely refuted by the Supreme Court itself, so that it cannot be
inferred, in limited proceedings of that sort (such as attachment
when the case is not personal), that the levy alone gives complete
authority to hear and determine the cause. Indeed, I cannot
express this departure from the doctrine of the Cooper case better
than to quote again from Windsor v. Me TIeigh (p. 277), where,
speaking generally of publication as jurisdictional in this class of
cases, the United States Supreme Court said: "Until notice is
given, the court has no jurisdiction in any ease to proceed to judgment, whatever its authority may be, by the law of its organization,
over the subject-matter." [Not italicised in the text.] If this is
contrary to Vroorhies v. Bank of the U. S., 10 Pet. 449, G ignon
v. Astor, 2 How. 319, &c., &c., it is later and should govern.
Besides, it is supported by other and yet later decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.
Notwithstanding the arguments drawn from principle and authority in favor of an affirmative answer to my question, there have
been some state decisions within a year or two, which are in accord
with the Cooper case; and its re-assertion and broadening of scope
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in a federal one (lJfatthews v. Densmore, 109 U. S. 216), fully
justify the presentation of the subject as one that needed ventilation. The fact that such eminent jurists as Judge COOLEY and
Mr. Justice MILLER differed upon its doctrine; that very enlightened courts have given conflicting deliverances, and that it is
exceedingly important to litigants that they should know what
attachment judgments may be collaterally assailed, as coram non
judce, would be sufficient apology for a more extended treatment
of the mooted point, and by an abler pen.
It is certainly the safer course for practitioners to follow substantially, and even strictly, the statutes of their respective states,
and not presume upon mere levies giving complete jurisdiction so
as to render publication nothing more than the subsequent exercise
of authority to determine ; nor rely upon the levy as giving any
special jurisdiction at all unless made under a valid writ issued upon
an affidavit in conformity to the statutory authorization of the
extraordinary remedy.
The case last mentioned presents another branch of the subject
of statutory jurisdiction conditionally conferred; the ancillary
attachment proceeding, as an " incident" of a pending case for
debt, and the essentials to special jurisdiction thereof. I will put
the matter into the form of a question, and make it the second part
of my article.
II. In a suit in personam, with general jurisdiction over the
defendant and the subject-matter, if the court should issue a -writ
conditionally authorized by statute-such as the writ of attachment-when there has not been compliance with the conditions,
would the order and the levy thereunder be void for want of special
?
jurisdiction
Those on the affirmative side of this question say that the writ
and its execution would be absolutely void, and open, therefore, to
collateral attack ; that a creditor, who has instituted his action for
debt and brought his alleged debtor into court, has no right to have
his claim secured by a lien (having the force of a mortgage if perfected by judgment) until he complies with the conditions of the
statute which gives him this extraordinary remedy ; that though
the court has complete jurisdiction over the subject-matter of this
simple suit for debt, and any error in its exercise cannot be exposed
collaterally, yet it cannot assume special authority without render-
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ing its assumption a nullity with all that follows it.

For, they

aver, the common-law jurisdiction of the suit for debt cannot
include the right and power of granting a remedy repugnant to the
common law, as attachment is conceded to be. And they say
further that the subject-matter of such suit does not have any
relation whatever to the unincumbered property of the debtor,
which is in no way involved in the litigation, though it may
be liable to execution after judgment; that the court cannot
order its seizure beforehand, unless specially empowered to do so,
by the legislature; and that if the legislative grant be upon conditions, there is no grant without compliance with the terms. And
they say that attachment prior to judgment is not a step in the
exercise of the common-law jurisdiction in the personal suit for
debt, and cannot be defended as a mere "incident" in the course
of a trial under such jurisdiction. On the contrary, they say such
act, when unauthorized by statute, cannot be ordered by any writ
without usurpation of power.
These views are so generally held by the bench and the bar that
it may be asked why I have put the question involving them.
Certainly, the profession would not have the patience to examine
a long string of authorities sustaining these views. Let it suffice
to say, on the other hand, that I am justified in presenting the
question by the argument of the negative side in the case of Matthews v. Densmore, 109 U. S. 216, reversing the decision of the
Supreme Court of Michigan.
In an ordinary suit for debt before the United States Circuit
Court, sitting in Detroit, in which that court had undoubted general
jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject-matter of that cause,
the plaintiff filed an affidavit and prayed for a writ of attachment,
but did not swear that the debt claimed was due upon contract, as
the statutory authorization of attachment required. The writ was
granted, however, and property belonging to the defendant, but in
the lawful possession of Densmore as chattel mortgagee, a stranger
to the suit, was directly attached-not reached by garnishment.
Densmore sued the marshal, in a court of the state, thus collaterally
assailing the order of attachment as void. Matthews, the marshal,
having been cast ifi this suit, took it to the Supreme Court of the
state; and there the judgment against him was affirmed on the
ground that the affidavit was insufficient, and the United States
Circuit Court, therefore, without the special jurisdiction necessary
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to the issuing of the writ, and that the levy was trespass and the
whole ancillary proceeding of attachment an absolute nullity.
In reversing this decision, the United States Supreme Court
held that the United States Circuit Court, having had general
jurisdiction of the defendant and the subject-matter of the suit
pending against him for debt, may have committed voidable error
by issuing the attachment writ on an insufficient affidavit, but that
neither. it nor the levy thereunder was absolutely void. They said
of the affidavit, speaking generally, that it "has served its purpose
when the writ has been issued and levied;" and they applied the
principle to the one under consideration, in which the creditor had
not sworn that the debt claimed was due upon contract as the
statute required. They held that the levy, made under such circumstances, was a mere "incident" of the ordinary suit for debt
which was pending under the general jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court. What had been a mere remark in the Cooper case by way
of distinguishing attachment suits in personam from those in remthat the issuance of the writ, in such case, is a mere "incident"
-was now repeated and made a reason for judgment. The general
jurisdiction seemed to be found to include power over this
The necessity of special jurisdiction over the ancil"incident."
lary proceeding, notwithstanding the general jurisdiction over the
main case, was not asserted but entirely overlooked. The court
said: "The writ cannot be absolutely void by reason of errors or
mistakes in the preliminary acts which precede its issue-it may be
voidable"-speaking generally of attachment writs. Again, it
said that the writ may be issued without the observance of all the
"requisite formalities," yet the absence of them is not thought
fatal to the acquisition of jurisdiction in the ancillary proceeding.
All this is equivalent to saying that without any affidavit at all,
and without complying with the statutory requisites at all, a court
of general jurisdiction may issue attachments which cannot be
collaterally assailed.
It is equivalent; for though the court called the affidavit "defective," the document was before them, not only written in the record,
but printed in a foot note to the report of the case as decided in
43d Michigan, showing that there was no oath to the maturity of
the debt as the statute required; showing that the affidavit was
"insufficient" as Judge COOLEY had characterized it. And, though
the court wrote of the non-observance of "requisite formalities,"
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the record before it showed that "requisite" authorization was the
thing wanting in the case. The fault was not informality but
invalidity.
The court virtually assumed the invalidity of the "preliminaries,"
and planted this personal case on the principle announced in the
Cooper case in rem; that a levy, rightful or wrongful by order of a
superior court, cannot be questioned except in an appellate court.
The difference between the two deliverances with regard to jurisdiction, however, should be noted ; in the one it is held that the
court gets it by the service of its own process-in other words, that
the
seizure gives jurisdiction in an attachment suit in rem ;-in
other, that the general jurisdiction in a pending personal case
justifies ancillary attachment.
The supporters of this decision and the negative of my question
contend that wrongful assumptions of special jurisdiction by a
superior court cannot be treated by an equal tribunal, as nullities;
especially, that those of a federal court cannot be collaterally
attacked in a state court. Having general jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant and the subject-matter of the personal
suit, such court may employ extraordinary remedies conditionally
conferred by statute; and, if they err in doing so, it is in the
exercise of the general jurisdiction that they err, and therefore
only an appellate court can review them. There is presumption
that the general jurisdiction has not been exceeded. Who but a
higher magistrate shall decide that there has been excess, when a
writ has been issued during the pendency of a cause rightly before
the court? If any equal court may inquire into the jurisdictional
right to issue it, may not some other equal court inquire into that
investigating court's right to inquire ? If the Michigan court could
pass upon the federal circuit court's jurisdictional power to order
an attachment, why may not the latter inquire into the jurisdictional right of the state court to decide upon the affidavit's merits
and upon the validity of the writ which was drawn in question in
Matthews v. Densmore?
The negative side of my question further say that the presence
of the defendant in court in that case gave him the opportunity to
object to the writ; *that he only had the right of objecting; that
his silence was assent to the special jurisdiction assumed.
The affirmative make the rejoinders, 1st, that jurisdiction can
always be questioned collaterally, and, 2d, that consent cannot give
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jurisdiction ; positions too well settled, they say, to require citations
of authorities to support them. It is certainly true that the presence of the defendant renders publication unnecessary to jurisdiction over the ancillary proceeding, but it does not cure fatal defects
in the affidavit upon which the attachment is issued ; and so, when
such affidavit is offered in evidence, in another court, it must be
tested by the statute. Silence may be politic on the part of a
defendant who sees the ancillary proceeding to be coram non judice;
for he may choose to sell his property before judgment, and even
before a valid attachment can be issued against it so as to create a
lien that would follow it into the purchaser's hands. And other
creditors might attack on good affidavits and rank the illegal
attacher who levied first.
Those who espouse the affirmative side of the question are curious
to know the source of the special jurisdiction of a court issuing an
ancillary attachment, if it is not from the statute authorizing the
remedy. Whence this power ? It does not come from the common
law, since the remedy is repugnant to it. It is not derived from
the antiquated distraimt to compel appearance, for that has grown
into desuetude; and, indeed, it never did warrant such special
authority. It is altogether different from the writ of distringas.
It is not traceable to the Custom of London, for that required an
affidavit, and also a pledge with sureties on the part of the creditor
to restore the attached property in case the debtor should appear
and defend within a year and a day-a valid affidavit and a valid
pledge. It is not from Civil Law attachment, nor from the debt
collecting system of Ancient India.
An eccentric friend suggests that a judge, trying an ordinary
suit for debt, may as well inject into it a criminal order to have the
defendant hung, as insert a writ to have his property taken from
him before judgment when there is no statutory right to attach it.
But the circuit court of Detroit was believed by the Supreme Court
of Michigan to have done the latter-to have issued a writ without
right. Whence the power? From the clerk, it is said. The
organ of the United States Supreme Court in the case lasi cited,
said that the officer whose duty it was to issue the writ might have
made some mistake but that did not deprive the court of jurisdiction acquired by the levy. He did not seem to hold that the issuance of the writ is a judicial act done through the court's minister,
but as a ministerial act for which the court is irresponsible; yet
VOL. XXXV.-63
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such as will result in giving special jurisdiction when the writ shall
have been obeyed by the attachment of property. But the issuance of the writ cannot be other than a judicial act, presumably
by order of court though by ministration of the clerk. Even when
the clerk is authorized by an act of the legislature to issue, attachment writs upon the filing of the required affidavit, the authorization
cannot be maintained as constitutional except on the principle that
the authorization of the officer is to him in his capacity as minister
or servant of the court acting as under a general judicial order.
Otherwise, the authorization would be the bestowal of judicial
power upon one not a judge. Were the judge dead and the bench
vacant, the clerk could not issue a writ of attachment under such
statute authorization.
Upon a review of the case of kHatthews v. Densmore, it is but
fair to conclude that the opinion of the court was not intended to
be so broad as to give an unqualified negative answer to such a
question as I have propounded. Certainly, so broad a deliverance
would put the court not only in conflict with most of the other
courts of the country but with the statutes themselves. The writer
of the opinion had specially in view the position of the marshal
who had a writ to execute which was fair on its face; and it was
thought unjust that he should be punished for obeying an order of
court. The writer of the opinion said he was bound to obey that
order. It might be suggested here, that the marshal was an officer
of the district rather than of the court; that he was not bound to
obey the order, if it was issued without jurisdiction, to the extent
of becoming a trespasser, any more than he would be obliged to
amend a return at the court's behest. To punish him for not obeying an order to amend a return would be an impeachable offence.
But this is digression. The only thought meant to be conveyed
is that the organ of the court, with a commendable disposition to
protect an officer who had evidently meant to do nothing wrong,
seems to have lost sight for the moment of the question of jurisdiction in the ancillary suit.
I think the bar of the country does not understand that attachment in personal suits is to be different hereafte'r from what it was
Courts sustain the attachment
before this case *as decided.
states
as before. Statutory authorizastatutes of their respective
tions, coupled with conditions, are interpreted as before. Attachment is not deemed such an "incident" in the course of an ordinary
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trial under general jurisdiction as to obviate the necessity of
creating special jurisdiction as a barrier against collateral assailment. The books still bristle with reports of attachment cases,
with all the old authorities cited in their pristine vigor.
I will suggest to the profession a few questions. Given, that the
defendant is in court, and that there is general jurisdiction over him
and the subject-matter of an ordinary suit against him for alleged
debt, if attaehment be made as a mere "incident" of such suit
without the observance of the statutory requisites1. Would the attachment create a lien to secure ordinary debt ?
2. Would such lien rank above those of junior attachers complying with the statute ?
3. Could the debtor convey title to his property between the
date of such incidental seizure and that of the judgment, such as
would enable the purchaser to defend against the lien ?
4. Could there be judgment with privilege on such attached
property ?
5. Could there be attachment as a mere "incident" in the exercise of general jurisdiction, if all attachment statutes were
repealed?
6. If not, whence the jurisdiction over the "incident" except
from the statute?
If ancillary attachment is a proceeding in rem distinguishable
from the pending personal suit for debt, the question of jurisdiction
must be identical with the one we herein first discussed. That it is
such a proceeding and constitutes a sort of suit by itself, seems to
be received doctrine. In an attachment case from Mississippi, the
personal judgment was affirmed but the one in rem was reversed
and remanded: Fitzpatrick v. Flannegan,106 U. S. 648, 660.
This might be done ina like suit from any state; for the debt being
proved, the personal judgment may be affirmed; yet, at the same
time, the judgment giving lien and privilege upon the attached
property might be reversed for non-compliance with statutory
requisites on the part of the attaching creditor. This would seem
to be antagonistic to the theory that ancillary attachment is a mere
incident of the main case.
If there are virtually two suits, and the persofial one is under
general jurisdiction, and the property one under special authority
conditionally conferred by statute, why may there not be lack of
the latter jurisdiction though presence of the former ? And, in
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case of such lack, why may not the judgment perfecting the inchoate
lien of attachment be void while the personal decree is valid ?
Ordinarily, the personal judgment may be executed upon any
property of the defendant, whether attached in the course of the
prior proceedings or not; but there are many circumstances under
which the validity of the attachment before judgment would not
cease to be questioned because of the general writ of execution.
If the defendant should sell the res of a jurisdictionless ancillary
proceeding before the rendition of the personal judgment, the purchaser would not allow its subsequent execution by the attachment
creditor to pass unchallenged. If junior attachers have obtained
legitimate privilege, they would be likely to question a judgment
in rem which they deem coram non judce, if it should stand in the
way of their perfected liens, though they might fully admit the
jurisdictional character of the accompanying personal decree.
When special jurisdiction has been lodged, may not its rightful
exercise be presumed after decree, just as in the case of general
jurisdiction ?
I think there can be no doubt of the presumption, when the
exercise is by a superior court, to which the question should be
confined. That is to say, if the special jurisdiction is merely that
which is over property by reason of seizure alone, the court must
be presumed to have acted within its power when making orders for
the preservation of the property, its sale to prevent deterioration or
destruction when it is of a perishable nature, and the like. When
the special authority is complete, so that there is jurisdiction to
enter judgment, doubtless there is presumption, after decree, that
a superior court has rightfully exercised this power, so that errors
can be corrected only in an appellate tribunal.
The mistake, to which even courts have been found liable, is the
confounding of partial jurisdiction with complete authority to hear
and determine, so as to make the requisites that must follow the
initial one (such as giving notice), mere acts in the exercise of the
custodial authority consequent upon the levy. What the statute
makes a condition must be observed at any stage of the cause under
penalty of nullity for want of the right and power which compliance would give. It is, therefore, not true that a valid writ, based
upon a sufficient affidavit, executed by a lawful levy, can possibly
render the statutory requirement of other acts any the less mandatory in order to jurisdiction to hear and determine ; and their
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observance is not presumable after decree, when the judgment of a
superior court is collaterally assailed.
IIl, Is the rule uniform in all cases where jurisdiction is conditionally conferred by statute ?
There are many conditional authorizations, such as those to order
the sale of minors' real estate, to empower the administrator to sell
the lands of a decedent to pay debts, to appoint commissioners to
assess property, to raise money for some public improvement, to
carry out drainage laws, to grant a divorce, to emancipate a minor,
to declare the status of a pauper, to commit an insane person to
an asylum, to effectuate bankrupt laws, etc., etc. These legislative
grants of power to the judiciary are usually coupled with conditions, such as the giving of notice-the requirement of stated preliminaries of various sorts. And when the statute authorizes judicial procedure on compliance with the conditions imposed, the rule
is that the court has no authority if they be disregarded. For
instance, a court of chancery has no authority to decree the sale of
the real estate of a minor, under a special statute, unless it strictly
pursues the course prescribed ; for without this, no title would pass
to the purchaser by virtue of the court's general jurisdiction:
Williamson v. Ball, 8 How. 566. In an ejectment suit, Justice
SWAYNE, for the Supreme Court, said : " The authorities, which
require the fact of competent jurisdiction to be presumed in certain
cases, have no application here. The statute is in contravention of
the common law, and hence to be strictly construed." And he
held notice to be jurisdictional, and the administrator's sale (which
he was considering) absolutely void for the want of it, though the
proceedings had been in a court of general jurisdiction : .Ransom
v. Williams, 2 Wall. 818.
I think the rule is uniform with respect to all the statutory
authorizations above mentioned; and that the two decisions cited
are samples of many of like import.
Tax suits furnish good illustrations. The requirement, in fllinois, that the collecting officer shall report delinquency to the court
must be obeyed to "call into activity an authority of the court before latent ;" and it is held that the report must conform to the
statute in every substantial particular, "or it will fail entirely to
have any efficiency for the purpose :" Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed.
527T, and cases there cited; Marsh v. Chestnut, 14 Ill. 223;
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Charles v. Waugh, 35 Id. 315; Morrill v. Swartz, 39 Id. 108;
Fox v. Turtle, 55 Id. 377; People v. Otis, 74 Id. 384; Andrews
v. People, 75 Id. 605. The author goes on to say that proceedings
of this nature are not usually against parties, but have regard to
the taxed land itself; and that, "as in all other cases of proceedings in rem, if the law makes provision for publication of notice in
a form and manner reasonably calculated to bring the proceedings
to the knowledge of the parties who exercise ordinary diligence in
looking after their interests, it is all that can be required." Where
the sheriff made no such report as the statute provided for, it was

held that the court never obtained jurisdiction to proceed in the
case. (Id., citing several decisions.) Then follows a list of statutory
requisites disregarded, which non-observance rendered the judgments void: Proceeding to judgment before the time limited for
the voluntary payment of taxes had expired; rendering a judgment
in a proceeding not taken against all owners and claimants, and by
service on the land ; failure of the collector's report to show whether
the taxes were state or county taxes, etc. The defects "went to
the power of the court to act at all :" Id.
Tax suits being of statutory authorization, there must be compliance with all the conditions of the grant, or nullity will result:
Jackson v. Esty, 7 Cow. 148.
In an action of ejectment, it was held that the court which had
decreed the sale of land to effect a partition, was without jurisdiction
because the statutory requirement that the petitioners must make
affidavit that they were ignorant of the names and rights of the
parties unknown, did not appear from the record to have been
obeyed: Denning v. Corwin, 11 Wend. 648 ; but it has since been
held that, in such case, there would be presumption in favor of the
record of a superior court: Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121. The
Supreme Court was authorized by statute to appoint commissioners
to assess land to pay for the opening of a street ; they were appointed, and they made an assessment which was confirmed by the
court, and land was sold under the judgment. It was held that the
jurisdiction, being special, depended upon compliance with the
statute: Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill 10. The judgment of a courtmartial was held void because the special jurisdiction conferred by
statute had not lodged by compliance with the conditions imposed:
Mills v. Martin, 19 Johns. 7, 33. When the penalty of an appeal
bond is not double the amount of the damages and costs of the
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judgment rendered, as required by statute, the Court of Common
Pleas acquired no jurisdiction of the case appealed to it: Latham
v. Edgerton, 9 Cow. 227. In a proceeding for a surrogate's sale
to pay debts, it is essential to jurisdiction that the petition should
have been accompanied by an account of the debts and of the personal estate in conformity to the statute: Bloom v. Burdick, 1
Hill 130. A decree of a county court, authorizing the sale of land,
is absolutely void if the notice required by statute has not been
given: .Haywood v. Collins, 60 Ill. 328. And the cases applying
the general rule to attachment authorization are numerous.
Is there any exception to this rule ? On principle, there would
seem to be none, for the same reason is applicable to all statutory
authorizations of special jurisdiction conditionally conferred. But
an exception was suggested in Cooper v. Beynolds, supra. The
court, admitting the rule, and instancing the requirement of publication in divorce suits, proceedings to compel conveyance and
other judicial actions pursuant to statute as coming under it, distinguished them from attachment, and held that the latter was
exceptional when in rem.
Prior to this, the rule had been held invariable-applicable alike
to all statutory proceedings whether personal or otherwise. It had
been so held generally, though there were some decisions that were
somewhat to the contrary in respect to presumptions after decree ;
they did not draw a line, however, between personal suits and
others, in this matter.
Proceedings to declare personal status, such as that of a bankrupt, pauper or lunatic ; of a minor praying to be emancipated; of
a husband or wife claiming a divorce, etc., have been treated as in
rem because the decree fixing the status is binding on all the
world: 2 Smith's Leading Cases, Am. ed., 689 et seq. And
attachment has been considered not in rem, because the judgment
is not thus conclusive upon all persons: Magee v. Beirne, 39 Penn.
St. 62; Benson v. Cilly, 8 Ohio N. S. 604. So, if the universal
conclusiveness of the decree were the true criterion by which to
judge whether a given proceeding be in rem, divorce suits and
others instanced by the Supreme Court as coming under the rule
because of their personal character, would really be such a proceeding, while attachment would not belong to this class. If fixing the
status of a person as divorced (which is universally conclusive),.
though done in a proceeding nominally personal, is like fixing the
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status of a thing as guilty, hostile or indebted, the argument for
the exception fails to hold good.
I concede, however, that though the decree sought
may be to
bind others than parties and privies, the proceeding cannot be in
rem unless it is, in effect, at least, against property itself. And, if
it is a proceeding against property, in form, or effect, or both, it is
necessarily in rem. whether the decree sought be universally conclusive or not. I think the definition in the cases last cited is incorrect,
and I am glad the Supreme Court of the United States have not
respected it, but have held attachment cases to be in rem where
there is no personal defendant, notwithstanding the form of the
suit. But, if universality of conclusiveness were the rule by which
to distinguish between the two classes of cases, the tables would be
completely turned ; a divorce proceeding could be in rem and an
attachment proceeding in personam, and the argument for the
exception would fall to the ground.
I agree with the court that the latter is, and the former is not
against a thing. But does this render the latter exceptional to the
rule that conditions must be observed when prescribed by a statute
conferring special jurisdiction ?
If it were true that proceedings against hostile things under the
law of nations (directed it may be, by municipal statute), would
divest liens without notice to lienholders not enemies : if it were
true that proceedings against offending things require no publication as essential to jurisdiction to determine the status; if it were
true that indebted property could be condemned to pay in a general
proceeding, without notification, still, it must be insisted, the legislature of a state has the right to impose conditions, and to make
publication one of them, when creating a remedy and conferring
jurisdiction to apply it. No general exception can be framed that
would relieve from the necessity of following the statute thus
creating and conferring. How can we say that the legislative
power is restricted or note according to the character of the remedy
it authorizes ? How can we say that the state can prescribe the
essentials of a statutory proceeding against a person, yet cannot in
such proceeding against a thing ? There is nothing in the nature
of the latter to justify cutting off interested persons from invitation
to their day in court. The jurisdictionless character of a decree in
.rem, where this privilege is denied to one entitled to it, and the
indispensability of notification of some sort to jurisdiction complete,
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are not too strongly stated in Windsor v. fle l'eigh, supra. And
when the proceeding against property is statutory, and conditions
are prescribed, the rule must be followed, even were general actions
against things governed by a different practice. And certainly it
would have been so held in the Cooper case, had the justices all
understood, with the dissenting one, that the laws of Tennessee
made publication jurisdictional.
The sole reason, on which the exception was based when first
enunciated, was abandoned in 2atthews v. Densmore, supra ; for,
the attachment therein, being treated as a mere "incident" in the
exercise of general jurisdiction in a personal suit, could not have
its non-conformity to statute justified on the plea that it was in
rem. And yet that case was decided on the authority of Cooper v.
Beynolds.
In conclusion, I call attention to the bearing which the questions
above propounded have upon the prevalent system of attachment
in this country, as distinguished from proceedings under the same
name in other countries. If ancillary attachment is a mere "incident" in the exercise of general jurisdiction, not dependent upon
compliance with statutory requisites ; if attachment of property
with the proceedings thereon, when there is no personal defendant
is to be treated as an action in rem not statutory, it must be on the
theory that the remedy is authorized by the common law. Indeed,
it has been seriously contended that it has come to us from that
source. Because Blackstone, Fleta, and others have written of
attachment when commenting on the common law, and because it
is certainly very ancient, and is found in the jurisprudence of many
countries, the advocates of the theory are slow to concede that our
remedy of the same name is wholly dependent upon our statutes.
The truth is, the commentators mentioned were wrifing of -a very
different thing. They were treating of attachment by distraint,
distingras, compulsory process to force the debtor to come into
court. The custom of taking gage, putting the creditor in possession on giving security, after a judgment nisi, which had its counterpart in almost every country of the continent-certainly in
Italy, France and Spain-as well as the common-law distraint
above mentioned (which has been somewhat adopted in New England and Pennsylvania, with something similar in Delaware and
formerly in Maryland and other states), is wholly unlike our
prevalent system in which attachment is a proceeding to create and
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